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Abstract
In the past years, work time in many industries has become increasingly flexible opening up a new channel for in-
tertemporal substitution. To study this, we set up a two-period model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard
saving model by allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts or to save. To test the exis-
tence of these channels, we conduct laboratory consumption/saving experiments. A novel feature of our experiments
is that we tie them to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption
smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our four main findings are: (i) subjects exercise more effort under certainty
than under risk; (ii) savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects (iii) a majority of subjects uses time
allocation to smooth consumption; (iv) saving and time shifting are substitutes, though not perfect substitutes.
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1 Introduction
The standard model based on the notion of consumption smoothing predicts leisure and thus work time to be smooth
as well (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). However, since flexible work arrangements are increasingly common, the
model fails to describe observed behavior, since work time is observed not to be smooth in many instances. The so-
called gig economy, for example, changed the environment for both labor supply and consumption/saving decisions of
many professionals from ride-sharing drivers, and bicycle couriers to data scientists, engineers, and architects (among
others). These professionals supply labor on online platforms like Uber, Delivery or Upwork without submitting to a
specific work time schedule.
Figure 1 shows three stylized facts from all Chicago taxi medallions over each day of the year 2014 (these medal-
lion holders are allowed to operate a taxi and can choose their work time and duration freely). Our first observation,
in the left graph, is that income per day is strongly correlated with the number of minutes worked per day but flat-
tens off at long hours. Second, the middle graph shows that income per day and minutes worked per day are strongly
associated contemporaneously (at lag 0) but are also positively related with past and future days (cf. Farber 2005). Fi-
nally, suppose taxi drivers would smooth their work time perfectly. Then, for a given income, we would not expect
any correlation between work time and the variance of income. The right graph shows that the simple sample vari-
ance measure of income is, however, correlated with minutes per day, sometimes positively, other times negatively.
The objective in this paper is to study channels which may lead to such a correlation in a stripped-down model.
Figure 1: Stylized facts on Work Time, Income, and Income Risk for Chicago Taxi Medallions
(a) Income versus Minutes and
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(b) Correlation of Income and Minutes
across Days
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(c) Correlation of the Variance of In-
come and Minutes across Days
Notes: We aggregated observations on all Chicago taxi medallions over 2014 by day and applied the fixed-effects or within-transformation to the data to generate these
figures. The data are available at the Chicago Data Portal.
This paper reconciles the theory with the facts by showing how precautionary reasons may explain why work time
is not smooth. The intuition is that instead of smoothing work time over calendar time like consumption, work time
may be used as channel to smooth consumption like saving. If precautionary behavior exists, this could be one motive
for regarding work time allocation as a substitute to saving. However, the current literature is ambiguous on how
important precautionary behavior is.
Therefore, we first show in which sense labor supply and savings may be substitutes and discuss the mechanics of
this alternative strategy for intertemporal substitution. For this purpose, we extend the standard model for consumption
and labor supply decisions and introduce shifting. The intuition of shifting is that flexibility in work arrangements
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allows to mitigate bad wage shocks. For example, if a person has two jobs, one with a certain wage, one with an
uncertain wage. Flexible work time allows to mix the earnings from the uncertain job with the uncertain job, so in
case the uncertain job turns out to pay very little, the earning from the certain job can partly offset this.1 Second, we
provide evidence for the existence of precautionary saving from laboratory experiments which are tightly linked to
our model. Here, we are able to control all the features of our model and to make sure that the only reason to save
is precaution, which is not possible using observatory data.2 A novel feature of our consumption/saving experiments
is that we tie them to a real-effort style task. As a third contribution, we show that not only precautionary saving but
also precautionary shifting exists in our experimental data, and fourth, that these two channels are indeed substitutes—
though not perfect substitutes.
We set up a two-period model in which the wage is certain during the first period. In the second period, a mean-zero
shock perturbs the wage (keeping the expected wage identical to that of the first period). We induce preferences that
resemble a progressive tax or isoelastic utility and compare decisions in four treatments: (i) a hand-to-mouth treatment
where neither a saving nor a shifting decision can be taken; (ii) a treatment where saving is allowed; (iii) a treatment
where shifting is allowed; and (iv) a treatment where both saving and shifting are allowed. While precautionary leisure
cuts are not possible, income has to be produced by exercising effort and subjects can adjust their work intensity in the
anticipation of risk and, thus, provide extra effort. Independently of the existence of extra effort, a part of the income
may be shifted from one shift to another via savings or work time allocation for the induced precautionary reasons.
We derive four hypotheses from our model to show whether the hand-to-mouth model, the standard precautionary
saving model, and the precautionary shifting model sustain the test with our experimental data and whether saving and
shifting are indeed substitutes.
First, we examine whether subjects behave according to Jensen’s inequality, which implies that they provide more
effort in the first period (when the wage is certain) than in the second (when it is risky). We find that on average
subjects follow this prediction and reduce effort in the experimental real-effort task by about 19 percent. Second,
does precautionary saving exist in our experiments? With at least 85 percent of the subjects engaging in precautionary
saving, we reject the non-existence of precautionary saving. Is precautionary effort—an increase in work intensity
when facing wage risk—absent as predicted? Non-parametric tests show that medians and distributions of effort are
identical. Thus, we find no evidence for precautionary effort. Third, does precautionary shifting exist? About 59
percent of all subjects engaged in precautionary shifting. Fourth, are saving and shifting perfect substitutes? Though
we find that they are substitutes, we reject that saving and shifting are perfect substitutes on aggregate.
The paper is structured in the following way: After providing an overview of the literature in the next section,
Section 3 presents our extension of the standard model of consumption and labor supply and our hypotheses. Section 4
1 Essentially, flexible work arrangements allow to determine shift-specific average wage by choosing the length of the work shift endogenously.
2 Our study complements research with data from outside the lab. Many attempts to quantify causal effects in real-world data are plagued by
problems like absence of credible measures of wage risk, effort, wealth or shift-specific information, the presence of many different saving
motives or incentives provided (e.g., by saving subventions or tax policy) and the presence of heterogeneous decision rules. In lab experiments,
we can control wage risk, information settings, induce a utility function and let subjects work under wage uncertainty. Lab experiments also allow
us to turn on and off savings channels and we can control for the subjects’ heterogeneity by exposing subjects to various different treatments. In
controlled environments, we are also able to keep variables constant that affect motivations like working for meaning and pleasure (which may
influence effort, see Heyman and Ariely 2004). Given this, it is surprising that there are only very few studies that investigate heterogeneity of
behavior in labor market experiments and of precautionary behavior.
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describes our experimental design and procedures. Section 5 presents and discusses our findings. Finally, Section 6
summarizes and concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
To understand how shifting relates to saving (i.e., either to forgo utility by cutting consumption or incur extra disutility
by cutting leisure or by providing more effort) and to put our research in the more general context of precautionary
behavior, we review the literature briefly.
2.1 Precautionary Saving
Precautionary saving is usually defined as the difference between consumption under certainty and in the presence
of risk (see, e.g., Kimball 1990, p. 55). Some empirical evidence from survey data shows that this kind of precau-
tionary behavior may be economically important.3 Gourinchas and Parker (2002) attribute 60-70 percent of wealth
to precautionary saving in early life. Kazarosian (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1998) estimate the precautionary
component of wealth to be in the range of 20-50 percent. However, the evidence is not unambiguous. With subjec-
tive earnings uncertainty, Guiso et al. (1992) estimate the precautionary component of wealth at only a few percentage
points. Lusardi (1998, 1997) and Engen and Gruber (2001) find small precautionary wealth as well. Hurst et al. (2010)
and Fossen and Rostam-Afschar (2013) argue that estimates are sensitive to whether business owners are included in
the dataset. As business owners often have more flexible work arrangements, this raises the question if the possibility
to shift determines the level of precautionary wealth.
Some of the problems in survey data may be avoided in experimental settings, but the experimental literature on
precautionary saving is relatively small. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) show that, in accordance with a
model that includes substantial precautionary effects, saving rates of most East Germans but civil servants increased
sharply after the natural experiment of the German unification. By contrast, West Germans—who would have been
subject to more selection into jobs based on risk preferences—exhibited little difference in saving rates between civil
servants and others with riskier jobs, either before or after reunification.
Duffy (2016, section 2.1) surveys the literature on consumption/saving decisions using laboratory experiments.
Here, we review some of the most important papers from this strand of literature in order to highlight how our exper-
iment differs from them. Ballinger et al. (2003) study precautionary saving and social learning (over a life cycle of
60 periods subjects had to take saving decisions after receiving a randomly determined income). Social learning in an
intergenerational structure was mimicked by allowing the subjects in the role of the younger-generation individual to
sit next to an older-generation subject and to observe its behavior and to interact with him or her during some peri-
ods before taking his or her own decisions (and being later on joined by yet another younger-generation individual).
Ballinger et al. find that subjects who could learn from ‘elders’ perform better than the ones who could not. Also,
subjects’ behavior is qualitatively correct but they save too little early in the life cycle. Brown et al. (2009) test two ex-
planations for this observed undersaving. The first reason, bounded rationality, was tested by giving some subjects the
3 See Section E in the Appendix for an overview of results on the existence and importance of precautionary behavior complementing the excellent
surveys in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017) and Lugilde et al. (2019).
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opportunity to observe other (well-performing) subjects’ behavior. Subjects who could learn socially performed better
than the subjects who only learned on their own. The second reason, a preference for immediacy, was examined in a
second experiment. Two groups of thirsty subjects received soft drink sips as period consumption. One group of sub-
jects received their consumption immediately, the other group only with a ten-period delay. Here, the former group
undersaved in comparison to the latter group and showed a lower total consumption level. Ballinger et al. (2011) cor-
relate measured personality traits and cognitive abilities with the performance in a savings experiment and find that
two cognitive abilities scales predict savings performance best. Meissner and Rostam-Afschar (2017) vary taxes in
a way that should keep savings/consumption decision unchanged and show that more than 50 percent of lab subjects
simplify consumption decisions by ignoring incentives for precautionary behavior.
What are the main differences between these previous experiments and ours? We test how subjects respond to
different institutions, i.e., the existence of different savings channels (instead of testing which behavioral explanations
determine savings/consumption decisions). Another difference is that, in all mentioned experiments, income was
randomly assigned; in our experiment, subjects have to work on a real-effort style task in order to generate income.
This novelty is crucial as we are explicitly interested in the precautionary effort channel that subjects may exercise
facing risky environments. Whereas the papers reviewed in Duffy’s survey consider complete life-cycles with up to 60
periods, our experimental design only considers two periods—the shortest time-span in which saving is meaningful.
This two-period design should not be interpreted as a complete life-cycle but as an episode in an individual’s life (we
consider this simplicity as an advantage for theory-testing because it is easy to communicate to subjects).
2.2 Precautionary Labor Supply
With flexible hours of work a second channel emerges through which individuals may react in a forward-looking way:
They may take into account their expectation about future wage risk when deciding how much to work in a given shift
(see Carroll and Kimball 2008, Flode´n 2006 or Low 2005). Individuals with higher risk, e.g., self-employed, would
work longer before the realization of shocks to accumulate precautionary wealth. Precautionary labor supply is then
defined as the difference between work hours supplied in the presence of risk compared to the situation without risk.
As an alternative to precautionary consumption cuts, precautionary labor supply always increases savings.
On the empirical side, very little research has been devoted to precautionary labor supply. As reported by Mulligan
(1998, p. 1034), “there is no empirical evidence that precautionary motives for delaying leisure are important”. Pista-
ferri (2003) finds that the effect of wage risk on labor supply is in line with theory, but in practice negligible. Jessen
et al. (2017) find that the self-employed would work 4.5 percent less if they faced the same wage uncertainty as the
median civil servant. Their estimates show that inflexible work arrangements constrain workers who can adjust hours
only after about four and two years, respectively, and thus act less in anticipation of risk. Because of measurement
issues, various important studies treat labor supply as synonymous with effort at work and time spent working (Heck-
man 1993, p. 116). However, already Marshall (1920, p. 438) notes that “for even if the number of hours [of work]
in the year were rigidly fixed, which it is not, the intensity of work would remain elastic”. Therefore, we redefine la-
bor supply as a function of two endogenous choices: effort and allocated time. Accordingly, we define precautionary
shifting as the difference in the relative length of a work-shift under risk and without risk when leisure is held constant.
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2.3 Precautionary Effort
While we focus on shifting, Eeckhoudt et al. (2012) and Wang and Li (2015) recognized that effort may also serve
to accumulate precautionary savings. Empirically, precautionary effort has only been indirectly addressed by Huck
et al. (2018). In their experiments, subjects work on a task and information about the two possible realizations of a
piece-rate is either (i) resolved; (ii) unknown; or (iii) chosen to be learned by the subjects. About a third of the subjects
are information avoiders in the last treatment who subsequently outperform the information seekers. For our study, we
define precautionary effort as the difference between effort costs under risk and under certainty. Our model predicts
the absence of precautionary effort. Accordingly, we only find little evidence for it in our data. While we stress that
precautionary effort—like precautionary labor supply—increases savings, precautionary shifting is an alternative to
saving. In other words, while labor supply (extra effort or less leisure) can be transformed into consumption and thus
savings intratemporally, we show that savings and labor supply (i.e., the distribution of fixed work time) are substitutes
intertemporally. In a related setting, the question whether time and money are perfect substitutes has been studied in
the context of charitable giving (see Brown et al. 2019).
Our study is related to experimental research on labor markets, surveyed, e.g., in Duffy (2016, section 4.2) and
Charness and Kuhn (2011). Most closely related is Dickinson (1999) who sets up a model where workers can substitute
on- and off-the-job leisure and tests it in experiments. In one of the conducted treatments, the subjects are only allowed
to choose their effort (while work hours are fixed), and in another, they are also allowed to leave the experiment
early. In both treatments, the piece-rate for the real effort-task is varied within-subject. The results confirm the
predictions of the model: subjects in the lab experiments substituted leisure on- and off-the-job, which explains the
negative substitution effects. Our model provides an alternative explanation for negative wage elasticities, since a
wage increase may change the optimal allocation of work-shifts. In contrast to Dickinson’s experiments, we only run
treatments where total work-time is fixed (as we are not interested leisure vs. work-time decisions, and, also, as we
do not want to let subjects’ opportunities to earn money or otherwise spend their time outside of the lab affect their
decision how long in total they would like to work on our real-effort task).
3 Theory
In this section, we first introduce the general framework of our model. Subsequently, we describe the four scenarios
where we, one by one, allow saving and shifting and derive the four hypotheses we test with our experiments.
3.1 A Simple Two-Period Model
Consider a simple two-period model with two work-shifts, where ex-ante total consumption C is the sum of expected
consumption in work-shift 1, c1, and expected consumption in work-shift 2, E[c2].4 In both work-shifts i = 1,2,
consumption is a concave function of income c(yi) which can either be interpreted as a progressive tax or as decreasing
marginal utility. We abstract from discounting. The individual’s problem is
4 The expectation operator needs to be applied to both work-shifts’ consumption because uncertainty about the second period’s wage can also arise
in the first work-shift.
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max
y1,y2
C = Eε [c(y1)]+Eε [c(y2)]. (1)
Work-shift specific income, in turn, depends on exogenously given, period-specific wage rates w j with periods
j = 1,2 and three kinds of shift-i-specific choices: effort ei, savings s, and choice of the relative length of the first
work-shift t ∈ [0,1].5 Both periods’ joint absolute length is exogenously fixed and lasts T units of time. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that each of the two periods takes 0.5×T units of time. At the beginning of
the second period, the period-specific wage rate w1 changes exogenously to w2. The first-period wage rate is certain,
w1 = w, while the second-period wage rate w2 is uncertain. In the second period, a mean-zero wage shock ε shifts
w2 = w+ ε either up or down.
It is important to emphasize that the occurrence of the wage shock is only revealed after all decisions have been
made. This renders it possible to isolate the effects of uncertainty (as in Flode´n 2006, Parker et al. 2005, Hartwick
2000, and Eaton and Rosen 1980), and is an element of some real-world settings. For example, to obtain a bonus
payment, it might be necessary to allocate effort before the amount of the bonus is known (e.g., because it depends on
the business cycle or the success of a group of comparable workers).6
The choice of t causes income yi in each shift to be determined by either the wage of a single period or the wages
of both periods. In particular, income in shift 1 is
y1 =

y1(t,w1,e1,s) if t < 0.5
y1(0.5,w1,e1,s) if t = 0.5
y1(t,w1,e1,w2,e2,s) if t > 0.5
(2)
and income in shift 2 is
y2 =

y2(t,w1,e1,w2,e2,s) if t < 0.5
y2(0.5,w2,e2,s) if t = 0.5
y2(t,w2,e2,s) if t > 0.5.
(3)
By different choices of t, different period wage rates determine the shift-specific income in the generalized model
and that t = 0.5 nests the standard model as a special case. While we assume shift-separable consumption, choosing t
different from 0.5 implies non-separability over periods. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this. In the standard model in Fig-
ure 2, labor supply is only chosen according to the (expected) wage of the period under consideration. However, this
setup rules out the possibility of influencing the expected wage by choosing the length of a work-shift.
Figure 3 shows an example where a worker decides to end the first work-shift early. Hence, he or she earns wage
rate w1 in this first work-shift. In the second work-shift, he or she earns both wage rates: w1 for each unit produced
in the time until 0.5×T and w2 for each unit produced until T . In this way, we generalize the standard model, which
5 Accordingly, the second shift’s relative length is then 1− t.
6 E.g., UberX drivers accept rides without neither knowing the distance of the ride nor the fee they receive (which depends in part on supply and
demand in the local market they serve).
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0 0.2×T 0.3×T 0.5×T 0.7×T 0.8×T T
Work-Shift 1 = Period 1 with wage w1 Work-Shift 2 = Period 2 with wage w2
Figure 2: Labor Supply and Wage Changes in the Standard Model
Source: Authors’ presentation.
does not take into account that the choice of labor supply may determine the (expected) hourly wage and that income
may be valuated at the end of a shift—not at the end of a period.
Work-Shift 1, w1< Period 1, w1
0 0.2×T 0.3×T 0.5×T 0.7×T 0.8×T T
Work-Shift 2, w1 and w2> Period 2, w2
Figure 3: Labor Supply and Wage Changes in the General Model
Source: Authors’ presentation.
Precautionary motive In each work-shift, after-tax consumption is related to income by a scaled and shifted isoe-
lastic function
c(yi) =
(
[1/(1− τ)(y1−τi −1)]−η
)
ζ . (4)
Here, τ determines the degree of risk aversion (the concavity of the consumption function) and prudence (the
convexity of marginal consumption), and its reciprocal 1/τ determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
induced by the tax system. Most importantly for our analysis, this tax schedule leads to a positive third derivative
implying prudence and thus risk will affect optimal choices.7 Prudence is measured by the parameter of relative
prudence (Flode´n 2006; Kimball 1990). In our case, this parameter is −yi c′′′c′′ = 1+ τ . Accordingly, marginal after-tax
consumption is higher when before-tax income is low, and the rate at which marginal after-tax consumption rises
when before-tax income falls is greater when before-tax income is low than when it is high.
Given the precautionary motive, there are two margins of choice that reflect precautionary behavior, both of which
we will analyze. First, as in the standard model, prudent individuals have an incentive to save in anticipation of wage
risk. Insurance against wage risk is the only reason for saving in our experiment since the expected wage is identical
7 In order to maximize expected total consumption payoff, the worker must reduce income in the first shift and increase it in the second, so as to
reduce the expected marginal consumption payoff of income in the second shift and increase it in the first. See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017,
p. 97) for details.
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in periods 1 and 2. The possibility to end a work-shift before or after a change in wage risk creates another route
to engage in precautionary behavior: prudent individuals have an incentive to sacrifice some payoff in shift 1 and
end it before the wage becomes uncertain in order to ensure that some income from the certain wage rate enters the
consumption function in the second shift.
Budget constraint The second major difference to standard labor supply models is that we specify a function c(yi)
that valuates benefits net of costs instead of the additive separable valuation of benefits and costs of work. Instead
of describing the situation of employees, where disutility of work accrues privately (and is valuated in an additive
separable way), in our model the costs of work can immediately be deducted as business expenses before valuation.
This resembles the situation of self-employed or freelancers more closely. The main reason for this design feature
is that it disincentivizes precautionary effort, i.e., higher effort in the first work-shift under uncertainty than under
certainty. Since precautionary effort works via savings, its existence does not confound our results. A positive side
effect is that the self-employment specification also requires fewer non-linear functions, which makes the experimental
setup simpler to explain.
In particular (we present the other cases below), the shift-specific budget constraint yi for the case t = 0.5 is given
by
y1 = w1×q(e1)− v(e1)− s, (5)
y2 = w2×q(e2)− v(e2)+ s. (6)
Shift-specific effort ei translates into a production quantity according to a production function q(ei) from which
costs of effort v(ei) are deducted. Income at the end of a work-shift, before saving, is then the product of wage times
production minus effort costs. From this income, savings are deducted in the first work-shift and added in the second
work-shift (without bearing interest).
Cost function We specify a cost function for effort that limits the optimal level of effort:
v(ei) =
ei
∑
k=0
ϕ× (k)2. (7)
At the beginning of each work-shift, the cost function is reset to zero. This and the quadratic form of the cost
function resembles fatigue effects with increasing effort. Note that we defined this cost function with our experiments
in mind, where effort levels are discrete.
Production function We do not impose a production function in the experimental design as we suspect productivity
to be highly heterogeneous. In line with Ga¨chter et al. (2016), who introduced the experimental real effort task, our
aim is to estimate the production function from the experimental data. As Ga¨chter et al. (2016), we will estimate
period-specific production functions of the form
q(e j) = β1(e j)0.5+β2(e j)2+ γ, (8)
where γ is fixed production, i.e., effortless output. As our structural predictions regarding the level of savings and
shiftings depend on the production functions, in the Appendix, we will estimate them to obtain point predictions.
9
However, we will also investigate deviations from the optimal share of income saved or shifted as this measure does
not depend on individual productivity.
3.2 Treatments
Here, we describe the four scenarios that arise due to the two precautionary channels that workers can or cannot use.
From now on, we will speak of treatments in order to use the same terminology as in the empirical part of this paper.
Our objective is to test if and how subjects use the different precautionary channels. We start with the simplest setup
in the first treatment and allow more choices in the following treatments, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Treatments and Choices
Static Intertemporal
Treatments Effort Saving Shifting Choices
Treatment I (shorthand TI) Allowed Not Allowed Not Allowed e1,e2
Treatment II (TII) Allowed Allowed Not Allowed e1,e2 s
Treatment III (TIII) Allowed Not Allowed Allowed e1,e2 t
Treatment IV (TIV) Allowed Allowed Allowed e1,e2 s t
Source: Authors’ presentation.
Treatment I: No Intertemporal Choice Many consumers lead a ‘hand-to-mouth’ existence: they simply consume
their net income and do not save (Kaplan and Violante 2014). This may be due to unsophisticated behavior (non-
optimizing, or ‘rule-of-thumb’ consumers), or due to the inability to trade in asset markets because of infinitely high
transactions costs. In our experiment, we restrict subjects in Treatment I to be hand-to-mouth consumers, i.e., t = 0.5
and s = 0. Thus, we generate a control treatment where intertemporal consumption smoothing is not possible. A
Lagrange functionL I for each work-shift i describes the individual’s optimization problem:
L Ii = Eε [c(yi,ei)]+µ
I(Eε [wi×q(ei)− v(ei)− yi]).
The expectation operator Eε is only relevant for work-shift i= 2. As the two work-shifts are not connected neither
via savings nor shifting, each optimization can be considered separately. With fixed work arrangements, the only
choice variable in this setting is effort ei in each work-shift.8
Here, the only effect of wage risk is that the optimal level of effort in the second shift is smaller than in the first.
This is due to Jensen’s inequality which is induced by the concave tax function. The intuition behind this is that a
(higher) mean-preserving spread in the wage risk disincentivizes effort (as the benefit of a higher wage in case the
good state of the world realizes cannot offset the detriment of a lower wage of the same magnitude in the other case).
We, thus, formulate the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 – Reduction of effort by risk: Effort will be smaller under uncertainty than under certainty, i.e., effort
in the second work-shift will be smaller than in the first work-shift of Treatment I.
8 The first order conditions for Treatments I through III can be found in Section F in the Appendix.
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Treatment II: Precautionary Saving While hand-to-mouth behavior can be observed in many situations, another
important behavioral tendency is to ‘save for a rainy day’. Precautionary saving has received much attention in the
literature, although, as mentioned in Section 2, evidence for it is mixed. The main purpose of Treatment II is to examine
whether precautionary saving exists. In each work-shift, effort ei is chosen, and, at the end of the first work-shift, the
savings amount s.
The Lagrange function L II changes only slightly compared to Treatment I’s: The two work-shifts are now con-
nected and the intertemporal budget constrains choices (see Equations (5) and (6)). Ex-ante, the sum of the net payoffs
from both periods is relevant. Abstracting from the borrowing constraint,L II can be written as
L II = c(y1,e1)+Eε [c(y2,e2)]+µ II(Eε [w1×q(e2)+w2×q(e2)− v(e1)− v(e2)− y1− y2]).
In the absence of risk, the intertemporal condition ensures that the net payoff in both work-shifts will be smoothed.
In our experiment, the expected wage in the second period is identical to the certain wage in the first period. There-
fore, given productivity and effort, there is no reason for a difference in net payoffs in both work-shifts except for
precautionary cuts of first-period income.
There are two things to note: First, under uncertainty a strictly positive amount of savings is optimal. In our set-
ting, the precautionary motive is the only reason to save enumerated by Browning and Lusardi (1996, p. 1797 and
pp. 1799–1801). As effort is not valuated separately from income, it will not help as a separate channel for smooth-
ing. Second, if the third derivative of c(yi) is non-positive, (precautionary) saving will be zero: cy1 = Eε [cy2 ] = cEε [y2],
such that e1 = e2 and c(y1,e1) = c(y2,e2). Intuitively, bad wage realizations will be foreseen and mitigated by sav-
ings.
Hypothesis 2 – Effort and precautionary saving: i. Absence of precautionary effort: Savings do not result from
an increased effort in the first work-shift. In Treatment II, effort in work-shift 1 will be the same as in work-shift 1 of
Treatment I.
ii. Existence of precautionary motive: In anticipation of the risk in the second period of Treatment II, a strictly positive
fraction of income will be saved (resulting in a consumption cut in the first period).
Treatment III: Precautionary Shifting Another option for shifting income intertemporally has been missed to
date: precautionary shifting. Based on the setup in Treatment I, in Treatment III we introduce the possibility to choose
when work-shift 1 ends. This changes the budget constraints for each work-shift such that each has now three cases as
shown in Equations (2) and (3).
The task is to choose the length of work-shifts via t and, in each work-shift, effort ei. The Lagrange function is
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L III = c(y1,e1)+Eε [c(y2,e2)]+µ III
{
(9)
+1{t=0.5} ×
[
2× t[w1×q(e1)− v(e1)]− y1
+ 2× (1− t)Eε [w2×q(e2)− v(e2)]− y2
]
+
(
1−1{t=0.5}
)
1{t<0.5} ×
[
2× t[w1×q(e1)− v(e1)]− y1
+ 2× (0.5− t)[w1×q(e1)− v(e1)]
+ 2×0.5Eε [w2×q(e2)− v(e2)]− y2
]
+
(
1−1{t=0.5}
)(
1−1{t<0.5}
)
×
[
2×0.5[w1×q(e1)− v(e1)]
+ 2× (t−0.5)Eε [w2×q(e2)− v(e2)]− y1
+ 2× (1− t)Eε [w2×q(e2)− v(e2)]− y2
]}
,
where 1{condition} is an indicator that equals 1 if the condition is true (and zero otherwise).9 Compared to Treatment
II, only the budget constraint is different: instead of subtracting a specific savings amount at the end of a shift,
the choice of the length of a work-shift determines how much is subtracted from income. Thus, the intertemporal
optimality condition is identical in Treatments II and III. For an optimizing decision-maker, both options are substitutes
for intertemporal substitution. In practice, however, behavior may vary depending on whether saving or time allocation
is allowed.
In the absence of risk, there will be perfect smoothing, i.e., effort in both periods will be identical, and t will be
0.5. Since intertemporal substitution can be achieved with the same costs as in Treatment II under risk, in Treatment
III under risk both effort levels will be identical to that of Treatment II and prudent decision-makers find it optimal
to finish work-shift 1 early given the risk in period 2. These decision-makers will use the certain wage in work-shift
2 to build up a level of precautionary wealth before working under the risky piece-rate. In other words: The shifting
channel allows to work for an average of the certain and the low wage rather than to work under the low wage alone.
Assume that someone has two jobs, one with a certain wage, another one with an uncertain wage, and the flexibility
to arrange when to work on which job. It would be optimal to mix some of the certain wage to the uncertain (in case
the bad state o the world realizes).
Hypothesis 3 – Precautionary shifting: In Treatment III, the first work-shift will be shorter than the second.
Treatment IV: Precautionary Shifting and Saving Under flexible work arrangements, workers may have the op-
tion of both determining when to finish a work-shift and whether to store value over time. Hence, we combine the
features of Treatments II and III. In Treatment IV, the budget constraints change slightly in comparison to Treatment
III because savings s are not restricted to zero anymore and may be non-negative. The Lagrange function and the op-
timality conditions, however, are identical to that of Treatment III (henceL IV =L III). This is because while savings
9 To keep the Lagrangian comparable to the two previous ones, we need to account for the two periods in our model, therefore we write two times
the time allocation term. This is because t = 0.5 nests Treatment I in Treatment III.
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enter the work-shift budget constraints, they cancel out in the intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, the resources
on which the decisions are based remain unchanged.
In the general setup of this analysis, shiftings and savings are in fact perfect substitutes. The comparison of the
data from Treatments II and III shows whether subjects achieve the same expected payoff by choosing either s or t.
Treatment IV goes one step further and allows us (together with the observations from Treatments II and III) to ana-
lyze which combination of work-allocation and saving is actually chosen by the subjects (as theory does not make a
statement whether one of the extreme cases of only saving or only shifting is chosen or a combination of the two). We
can test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 – Precautionary saving and shifting: i. In Treatment IV, either work-shift 1 will be shorter than work-
shift 2, or there will be positive savings, or both.
ii. Identical choices and outcomes with intertemporal substitution: subjects will reduce savings when given the oppor-
tunity to shift and will reduce time in work-shift 1 when given the opportunity to save. Expected payoffs in Treatments
II, III, and IV will be identical.
4 Experimental Procedures
Our experimental design follows our model. Because we expect a high level of heterogeneity of productivity between
the subjects that we want to account for, we use a within-subject design for our individual decision-making experi-
ments. Before we describe the different stages of the experiment, we explain the real-effort task that resembles work
in our experiments.
The task We use the ball-catching task introduced by Ga¨chter et al. (2016). Figure 4 shows an example screen of
this task. In the ball-catching task, subjects are presented a rectangular box. There are balls hanging at the top of the
box in four columns and a tray is positioned at the bottom of the box. As soon as subjects click the start button, balls
fall down the screen in either one of the four columns at constant speed (probabilities are equal for the next ball to
fall down in any column). Subjects earn the piece-rate w j within period j by catching balls with the tray (hence, the
expected work-shift revenue is Eri = qi1×w1 +E (qi2×w2) with qi j the number of caught balls in shift i and period
j). In order to catch the balls, the subjects can move the tray from one column to the other by clicking two buttons
under the rectangular box labeled LEFT and RIGHT.
Moving the tray is costly in monetary terms; this can be interpreted as the labor effort employed in a shift. ei
designates the number of movements in a shift.10 To implement an increasing marginal cost of effort, we use the
following unit cost function in each shift i: κ(ei + 1) = 0.1× (ei)2 with ei + 1 being the next movement and ei the
number of movements so far.11 At the beginning of each work-shift, the unit cost function is reset, ei(0) = 0. The total
10 In contrast to many other real-effort tasks that are designed to be tedious for the subjects in order to “bring the task more in line with what people
consider labor” (Charness and Kuhn 2011, pp. 243-244), the ball-catching task explicitly quantifies the cost of effort in monetary terms. Hence,
we consider the ball-catching task ideal for our research questions. Even if subjects enjoy the task, the cost of effort should keep them from
exercising more effort than necessary.
11 We round the unit costs up to one integer in order not to confuse subjects with the decimals.
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Figure 4: Example Screenshot of the Ball Catching Task (with ‘Shift Change’ Button at the Bottom)
Source: Authors’ presentation.
cost per shift is given by the sum of unit costs, νi(ei) = ∑eik=0κ(k). Therefore, this task generates a tradeoff between
the revenue from catching balls, ri, and the total cost of effort, νi(ei). The point earnings in any one of the two shifts
are then given by revenue minus cost, yi = ri− νi− s, where s denotes savings. The euro earnings in each shift are
calculated by Euroi = 4× [ln(yi)−7].12 This payoff function implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of τ = 1 and
of relative prudence of 1+ τ = 2.13 The variables number of caught balls, unit cost of the next movement, total cost,
point earnings per ball, and total point and euro earnings in the current work-shift are continuously updated on-screen
during the task. Once the task is started by pressing the start button, it cannot be paused. When the work-shift ends
(either by the computer or by the subject’s choice), a feedback screen with the statistics mentioned before is shown.
Let us shortly delve into the practical problem of determining the (optimal) effort level. Since balls fall at a
constant speed in randomly determined columns, one might get a quick revenue increase from moving the tray into the
columns containing balls, but then would not be any better off (as the cost for movements increases disproportionately
which makes future movements very costly). This trade-off means that, on average (due to the randomly determined
columns), there is an optimal number of moves given the (expected) piece-rate. From our own experience when
programming and testing the experimental software, one is best off by exercising constant effort over time within a
shift: neither letting the tray stay put in one column for a long time, nor catching many balls in a short time span are
good alternatives to “effort smoothing.”14
12 This logarithmic utility function is a special case of the shifted isoelastic utility function in Section 3.1: limτ→1
(
[1/(1− τ)(y1−τi −1)]−η
)
ζ =
(ln(yi)−η)ζ .
13 This is in line with estimates in Fagereng et al. (2017, p. 396) using Norwegian administrative data.
14 In our results, we will touch these issues only very shortly and in the Appendix, in Section J, we examine the question “learning how to produce”
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Part 1 of the experiment: Trial periods During this phase, we let subjects play three incentivized trial periods so
they can familiarize themselves with the user interface and mechanics of the task. Only one of the three trial periods is
chosen randomly for payoff and feedback about the chosen period is only shown at the very end of the experiment.15
In a first trial period, we deviate from the costly effort-incentive structure and make movements costless. We also
abstract from the concave consumption function. Subjects are given 180 seconds to catch balls, with each caught ball
generating earnings of 1 euro cent. There is no tradeoff between the returns from catching balls and the monetary costs
of effort in this trial period. In the following two trial periods (and for the rest of the experiment), subjects work with
the concave consumption function, the convex cost function, and the point earnings outlined before. In the second
trial period, subjects work on the task and earn the certain wage, w = 100 for 180 seconds. In the third trial period,
subjects work under uncertainty and either earn the low or the high wage, w = 20 or w = 180, with equal probability,
for 180 seconds.
Part 2 of the experiment: Main treatments In Part 2, we conduct the four main treatments in the order in which
we described them in Section 3.16 In the instructions and on-screen we talk about four rounds, not about treatments.
Here we will stick to the term ‘treatments’. Each of the four treatments consists of two periods of 180 seconds each
(the first one with the certain wage, the second with the uncertain wage) and two work-shifts (which are defined as the
time where subjects work without a break on the task). Only one of the four treatments is chosen randomly for payoff.
Furthermore, feedback about the chosen treatment is only presented at the very end of the experiment.
Treatment I This is the simplest treatment as subjects have neither the savings nor the time allocation option at their
disposal. Subjects work on the task for two work-shifts that coincide with the periods (a` 180 seconds). In the first
work-shift, subjects earn the certain piece-rate w1 = 100. In the second work-shift, they work under uncertainty and
earn either the high rate, w2 = 180, or the low rate, w2 = 20. The instructions stress that the probability for the low or
high rate is equal and independently drawn in each of the treatments.
Treatment II This treatment differs from Treatment I only in the savings decision. If subjects earned a positive euro
amount in the first work-shift, they enter a screen where they can calculate the consequences of hypothetical saving
decisions with a slider. They then enter the number of points they would like to save in a separate box. (The savings
amount has to be non-negative, s≥ 0, and the highest amount that subjects can save is limited so that the euro earnings
in work-shift 1 cannot become negative). After that, they press the OK button and proceed to the second work-shift.
The amount of points saved is then deducted from the point earnings of the first work-shift and added to the point
earnings in the second work-shift. See Figure D.1 in Section D of the Appendix for a screenshot of the savings screen.
across our four treatments and estimate production functions that determine the number of caught balls depending on the number of moves and
in Section K, we use these production functions to calculate optimal saving and shifting levels in a structural model. However, our main results
in this paper are treatment comparisons of savings and shifting decisions.
15 This is a common technique in order to avoid portfolio effects when subjects make multiple decisions. It also helps us to keep each decision
salient by paying a relatively high amount per decision. See Charness et al. (2016) for a discussion of paying one or few decisions vs. paying all.
16 We considered randomizing the order of the four treatments between subjects. But by sticking to the order in Section 3, we gradually increase
the level of difficulty. Thereby, we intend to limit our subjects’ confusion that could occur due to, e.g., taking both a shifting decision and then a
saving decision in the first round.
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Treatment III This treatment differs from Treatment I in the time allocation between the two work-shifts. Subjects
can freely divide the total amount of time, T = 360 seconds, between the two work-shifts. This is implemented in the
following way: In work-shift 1 subjects are shown a button that allows them to immediately switch to work-shift 2 at
any point of time (see Figure 4 for a screen-shot of a first work-shift with the switch button at the lower left corner
of the task screen). The time remaining of the initial 360 seconds is then spent in the second work-shift. As soon as
subjects enter the second period, the low wage’s point revenue and euro earnings are displayed on the left-hand side
of the task box, and the high wage’s on the right-hand side of the task box.
Treatment IV In this treatment, both the savings decision of Treatment II and the time allocation of Treatment III
are available to the subjects. First, subjects have to decide when to end work-shift 1. After being shown feedback on
their outcomes in work-shift 1, subjects enter the savings screen where they can enter their savings decision.
Part 3 of the experiment: Elicitation of risk aversion and prudence In order to elicit the risk aversion and
prudence of the subjects, we consecutively presented them with 12 binary choices between lotteries, as suggested by
Noussair et al. (2014). Figure D.2 in Section D of the Appendix shows an example screenshot. Due to the potentially
very high payoff of up to 165 euros, each subject only had a 1 in 20 chance of being randomly selected to receive a
monetary payment from Part 3 of the experiment (which lasted about five minutes).
Post-experimental questionnaire In the post-experimental questionnaire, we asked the subjects for their gender,
age, field of study, their number of semesters at university (including undergraduate studies), and how strenuous they
perceived the experiment to be (on a scale from 1 (not at all strenuous) to 6 (very strenuous)). We also asked for a
subjective self-assessment of their general level of risk aversion (the wording of this question is identical that used
by the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), with answers ranging from 0 (not at all willing to take risks) to 10
(very willing to take risks)). Moreover, we asked whether subjects knew anybody who previously participated in this
experiment and whether they tended to pay attention to the low or to the high piece-rate in the periods where the rate
was uncertain.17
Procedures and subjects Upon arrival at the laboratory, the subjects were seated in separate booths. Then, the sub-
jects received printed instructions which included tables with selected values and graphs of the cost and consumption
functions. After reading the instructions, the subjects had to answer a set of control questions correctly in order to pro-
ceed.18 The experiment was computerized. Only after the subjects completed the three parts of the experiment and
answered the questionnaire they did receive feedback about the outcomes of the experiment and their euro earnings.
Finally, the payoff took place privately in a room separate from the other subjects.
All experiments were conducted in PLEx, the Potsdam Laboratory for Economic Experiments at Universita¨t Pots-
dam19, in November and December 2017. All 192 subjects were students of Universita¨t Potsdam and other nearby
17 Surprisingly, we do not find that any of our measures correlates with saving behavior in the experiment.
18 You can find a translation of the instructions, the supplied tables, and the control questions in Sections A, B, and C of the Appendix. The original
instructions in German are available upon request.
19 Economic experiments are not subject to the university’s Institutional Review Board.
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universities (Freie Universita¨t Berlin, Filmuniversita¨t Potsdam, and University of Applied Sciences Potsdam) and
were 18 years or older. Subjects were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). We did not apply any exclusion criteria
to the registered subjects in the database. Every subject participated only once. The experiments were run on z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007), in 19 sessions of 4 to 14 subjects (depending on enrollment to the experimental sessions and at-
tendance of subjects). The laboratory sessions took about 90 minutes. On average, subjects earned about 15 euros
(with a minimum of 0 euros and a maximum of 66.20 euros).20 Section G in the Appendix presents a summary of our
sample and discusses it briefly.
5 Results
Before we turn to the tests of the four hypotheses, we illustrate the most important data. Table 2 provides summary
statistics of the data from the 192 subjects, separately for each of the treatments.
Table 2: Summary of data
Round TI TII TIII TIV
Movements in Shift 1 32.71 30.73 27.64 27.73
[30.00] [30.00] [27.50] [27.00]
(18.44) (17.37) (17.15) (16.53)
Movements in Shift 2 26.54 25.20 26.52 25.46
[24.00] [24.00] [22.50] [22.00]
(17.53) (14.93) (21.60) (19.76)
Savings 2011.64 1511.16
[2000.00] [1497.50]
(1244.67) (1115.59)
Share of Saved Income 0.30 0.25
[0.30] [0.24]
(0.18) (0.16)
Proportion With Savings 0.90 0.87
Higher than 100 Points [1.00] [1.00]
(0.31) (0.34)
Time Shift 1 165.66 170.53
[162.00] [181.00]
(70.54) (61.02)
Share of Shifted Income 0.15 0.09
[0.15] [0.00]
(0.29) (0.28)
Proportion With Work-Shift 1 0.59 0.47
Shorter than 180 Seconds [1.00] [0.00]
(0.49) (0.50)
Expected Payoff 8.77 11.20 9.07 10.93
[11.82] [12.69] [12.14] [12.72]
(9.82) (7.56) (8.77) (7.14)
Observations 192 192 192 192
Notes: Mean, Median in square brackets, and standard deviation in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
Average and median movements in shift 1 are greater than in shift 2 in all treatments. Savings are larger in
Treatment II than in Treatment IV, reflected also by the higher share of saved income. Average time spent in work-
shift 1 is smaller than 180 seconds in both treatments, indicating precationary shifting. As the share of saved income,
the share of shifted income is larger in Treatment III than in Treatment IV. However, in Treatment IV the sum of these
20 One might criticize the low euro earnings in this experiment. As mentioned in the introduction, some subjects disregarded effort costs. In fact,
23 of the subjects earned zero euros. If we calculate the average without them, each subject earned about 17 euros. However, we do not exclude
them from our analysis.
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two variables, 34 percent, is relevant. This means that in Treatment IV more income is transferred over time than in
Treatments II and III. Finally, the proportion of subjects with savings larger than 100 points is very high, while only
around 50-60 percent of subjects transfer income from shift 1 to shift 2 via time allocation.21 Section I in the Appendix
discusses differences across treatments taking subject specific effects into account.
Table 2 also shows that expected payoffs are greatest in Treatment II and smallest in Treatment I, where neither
saving nor shifting is allowed. The entire distribution of expected payoffs as percentage of maximum expected payoff
in each treatment is shown in Figure 5 in comparison with the first treatment without intertemporal choice. In the
three treatments where subjects could smooth their consumption, expected payoffs are higher than in our baseline
treatment, Treatment I.22 This shows that the incentives provided by allowing intertemporal choice were used and
shifted the payoff distributions to the right.
5.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1 to 3
In this section, we discuss our results regarding Hypotheses 1 to 3. Table 3 reports the findings for the first hypoth-
esis. The results of t-tests suggest that there is the theoretically predicted effect of risk: in Treatment I, we observe
significantly fewer movements in work-shift 2 than in work-shift 1 (p-value< 0.001). This provides strong evidence
for Hypothesis 1.
Table 3: Tests of Hypotheses 1
H1: Effort Smaller in Second Work-Shift
than in First Work-Shift of TI
Movements
Mean TI Shift 1: 32.71
Mean TI Shift 2: 26.54
∆ 95% Conf. 4.61 to 7.75
t-test p-val. <0.001
χ2 p-val. <0.001
Rank-sum p-val. <0.001
Notes: P-values are from t-tests with the hypothesis that the
average difference of observations ∆ is zero, from Pearson
χ2 tests with the hypothesis that the two independent sam-
ples were drawn from populations with the same median, and
Wilcoxon rank-sum test with the hypothesis that the samples
are from populations with the same distribution.
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 6a illustrates this finding. The distributions of movements are clearly different; the median values of
each distribution, as indicated by the blue and red vertical lines, differ substantially (Wilcoxon rank-sum test has
p-value< 0.01 and Pearson χ2 test of the equality of the medians has p-value< 0.01).
21 We chose 100 points as the threshold in order to be far enough away from the zero-lower bound but the results change very little if we use > 0
points or > 1 point as criterion.
22 Figure H.1 in the Appendix displays a 3D graph that shows expected earnings in all four treatments.
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Result 1: In Treatment I, effort in the second work-shift is smaller than in the first work-shift. Subjects behave ac-
cording to Jensen’s inequality and reduce effort under uncertainty by about 19 percent (according to the 95 percent
confidence interval: 14-24 percent).
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Source: Authors’ presentation.
Next, we discuss Hypotheses 2(i) and 2(ii). Hypothesis 2(i) states our expectation that precautionary effort does
not exist. Again, we use t-tests to test our hypothesis. The results in Table 4 show that movements in both work-shifts
are statistically different (p-value=0.016). Although this supports the notion that some subjects might have tried to
exercise precautionary effort, the difference is not economically relevant.23
23 In fact, as we show in Section I in the Appendix, subjects caught slightly fewer balls per move in all first shifts. If anything, this is evidence
against precautionary effort.
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Figure 6b illustrates this. The medians lie exactly on top of each other (Pearson χ2 test of the equality of the
medians has p-value= 0.54) and also the distributions do not differ much (Wilcoxon rank-sum test has p-value= 0.36).
This provides evidence for Hypothesis 2(i).
Table 4: Tests of Hypotheses 2 (i)
H2(i): Absence of Precautionary Effort
(Higher First Shift Effort in TII)
Movements
Mean TI Shift 1: 32.71
Mean TII Shift 1: 30.73
∆ 95% Conf. 0.37 to 3.59
t-test p-val. 0.016
χ2 p-val. 0.540
Rank-sum p-val. 0.358
Notes: P-values are from t-tests with the hypothesis that the
average difference of observations ∆ is zero, from Pearson
χ2 tests with the hypothesis that the two independent sam-
ples were drawn from populations with the same median,
and Wilcoxon rank-sum test with the hypothesis that the
samples are from populations with the same distribution.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 5 presents our evidence regarding the existence of precautionary saving (stated in Hypothesis 2(ii)). It shows
that Hypothesis 2(ii) cannot be rejected in a test of proportions: In Treatment II 93 percent of the subjects saved more
than 100 points (and 91 percent did so in Treatment IV); p-value= 0.05. According to the 95 percent interval, at least
85.26 percent of subjects in Treatment II behaved in this way (slightly less, 82.22 percent, in Treatment IV). This pro-
vides strong evidence for Hypothesis 2(ii). Both the upper and lower bound of the confidence interval are lower in
Treatment IV than in Treatment II. This suggests savings were substituted by shifting. Figure 6c displays the saving
amounts in Treatments II and IV. It shows that 20 subjects out of the 192 chose not to save in Treatment II (25 sub-
jects in Treatment IV).
Table 5: Tests of Hypotheses 2 (ii)
H2(ii): Proportion With Savings
Higher than 100 Points Greater Zero
Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. p-val.= 5%
TII 89.58 (2.20) 85.26 to 93.90 H0 : 93.16
TIII — — — —
TIV 86.98 (2.43) 82.22 to 91.74 H0 : 91.02
Notes: All proportions are given in percent. Proportions
in column labeled “p-val.= 5%” are obtained from tests
of proportion with p-value equal to 5%.
Source: Own calculations.
21
Result 2: i. Precautionary effort is virtually absent, since median effort and thus effort costs are identical in the two
work-shifts of Treatments II and IV.
ii. In Treatment II, savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects (and for 82 percent of subjects in
Treatment IV).
Next, we test Hypothesis 3. A test of proportions reported in Table 6 strongly rejects the hypothesis that precau-
tionary shifting does not exist. Even the hypothesis that 66 percent of the subjects in Treatment III shift work time in
order to insure against risk can only be rejected at the 5-percent significance level (in Treatment IV, this applies to 54
percent of the subjects). According to the 95 percent confidence interval, at least 51.89 percent of the subjects ended
their first work-shift before 180 seconds in Treatment III (in Treatment IV: 40.33 percent). This provides evidence in
favor of Hypothesis 3. We can also see that a smaller fraction of subjects chose to shift in Treatment IV than in Treat-
ment III. Once the possibility of intertemporal substitution via savings was given, many subjects substituted finishing
work-shift 1 early with savings — this forestalls Hypothesis 4.
Table 6: Tests of Hypotheses 3
H3: Proportion With Work-Shift 1
Shorter than 180 Seconds Greater Zero
Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. p-val.= 5%
TII — — — —
TIII 58.85 (3.55) 51.89 to 65.81 H0 : 65.57
TIV 47.40 (3.60) 40.33 to 54.46 H0 : 54.44
Notes: All proportions are given in percent. Proportions
in column labeled “p-val.= 5%” are obtained from tests
of proportion with p-value equal to 5%.
Source: Own calculations.
Interestingly, the difference of the average proportions across treatments is smaller for saving than for shifting.24
The reduction of saving and shifting when the subjects have both channels is in line with our theory. Figure 6d shows
the time spent in work-shift 1. The median work-shift choice indicated by the solid red bar is less than 180 seconds in
Treatment III, where only shifting is possible. However, the median in Treatment IV is exactly at 180 seconds. Both
distributions have two local peaks, one at 180 seconds and one at 120 seconds in both treatments. This suggests that
subjects choose at least two distinct strategies — the first group sticks to the learned strategy of equal time allocation
to both work-shifts, the other group adjusts according to theory.
Result 3: In Treatment III, work-shift 1 is shorter than work-shift 2 for around 59 percent of the subjects (according
to the 95-percent confidence interval: 52 to 66 percent). In Treatment IV, this share is lower with around 47 percent
on average and between 30 and 54 percent according to the 95-percent confidence interval.
24 Because the share of savers in TII (89.58%) minus the share of savers in TIV (86.98%) is smaller than the share of shifters in TII (58.85%) minus
the share of shifters in TIV (47.40%).
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In the Appendix, we show the show additional results and robustness checks. Section I in the Appendix shows
that subject-specific factors like individual ability do not confound the results by providing comparisons of average
outcomes across treatments obtained with fixed effects regressions. Section J in the Appendix describes the estimation
of the production functions used in Section K in the Appendix to calculate optimal saving and shifting levels. Even
though there is substantial heterogeneity, the predicted level of savings is not significantly different from the observed
level. The level of shifting is, however, overpredicted by our theory.
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 4: Is Shifting a Substitute for Saving?
In this section, we test whether and how subjects substitute savings for shiftings. Figure 7 presents visual evidence for
how subjects substitute the two methods of intertemporal substitution. Figure 7a plots the share of income saved in
Treatment II, where only saving is allowed, on the horizontal axis and the same figure from Treatment IV, where both
saving and shifting are allowed, on the vertical axis. The linear regression line is flatter than the 45-degree line (slope
0.383 with standard error of 0.034; pairwise correlation coefficient of the data points ρ = 0.375; p-value=0.000). This
is consistent with the substitution of saving and shifting.
Figure 7b shows similar evidence for shifting in Treatments III and IV. Here the share of income shifted in Treat-
ment III is presented on the horizontal axis and the same figure in Treatment IV on the vertical axis. Again, the
regression line is flatter than the 45-degree line (slope 0.385 with standard error of 0.023; pairwise correlation coeffi-
cient of the data points is ρ = 0.524; p-value=0.000). This finding is also in line with the substitution of saving and
shifting.
In Figure 7b, we can visually identify two groups of subjects: (i) subjects that choose to be on or close to the 45-
degree line, and (ii) subjects that replicate both restrictions of Treatment I in both Treatment III and IV (resulting in the
cluster around the 0 percent/0 percent point). The latter group seems to abstract from risk to simplify the intertemporal
model.
Taken together, our results from this and the previous section provide evidence that shifting and saving are indeed
substitutes, though not for all subjects. If they were perfect substitutes, the average earnings would be identical across
Treatments II, III, and IV. Do expected euro earnings differ depending on which choices are available? To answer this
question, we conduct OLS regressions of expected euro earnings (euro earnings for low and high wages, weighted
with equal probability), euro earnings if the low wage is realized, and euro earnings if the high wage is realized on
treatment dummies (Treatment I serves as the baseline). Table 7 shows the results.
First, we consider all observations. In the first column, we observe that subjects in Treatments II, III, and IV earn
significantly more than in Treatment I (before knowing which of the two possible states of the world occurs). When
we compare the earning differences in Treatments II, III, and IV, we see that earnings in Treatments II and IV are not
significantly different from one another and that earnings in Treatment III are significantly lower than in Treatments II
and IV.
The second and third column show how euro earnings are affected ex-post. In case the ‘bad’ state of the world
occurs, in column 2 the same pattern as under uncertainty emerges (only with higher magnitudes of the constant and
the treatment dummies’ coefficients). This means that subjects use saving and shifting as precautionary measures
against a ‘rainy day’ but not as a perfect substitute for one another.
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Figure 7: Test of Hypothesis 4
Source: Authors’ presentation.
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Table 7: OLS regression of euro earnings on treatment dummies
Full Sample Income Cut≥0
Euro earnings Expected Low High Expected Low High
Treatment I (Constant) 8.76∗∗∗,a,c 2.38∗∗∗,a,b,c 15.14∗∗∗ 8.76∗∗∗,a,b,c 2.38∗∗∗,a,c 15.14∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.84) (0.67) (0.71) (0.84) (0.67)
Treatment II-Dummy +2.43∗∗∗,b +5.01∗∗∗,b -0.14 +2.43∗∗∗ +5.01∗∗∗ -0.14
(0.41) (0.58) (0.37) (0.41) (0.58) (0.37)
Treatment III-Dummy +1.09∗∗,a,c +2.79∗∗∗,a,c -0.61 +1.48∗∗ +3.43∗∗∗,c -0.46
(0.52) (0.68) (0.52) (0.63) (0.84) (0.61)
Treatment IV-Dummy +2.09∗∗∗,b +4.69∗∗∗,b -0.51 +2.40∗∗∗ +5.06∗∗∗,b -0.25
(0.54) (0.68) (0.53) (0.61) (0.74) (0.61)
Observations 768 768 768 665 665 665
Robust standard errors clustered at subject level.
Significantly different from zero at the 1%-level: ∗∗∗, 5%-level: ∗∗.
Significantly different from Treatment II’s coefficient at the 1%-level: a, from Treatment III’s: b, from
Treatment IV’s: c.
Source: Own calculations.
In column 3 we can see how much income the subjects on average give up in case they do not need to insure,
i.e., the ‘good’ state of the world occurs. None of the coefficients for Treatments 2, 3 and 4 is significantly different
from zero: hence, the price subjects pay for their precautionary behavior is rather low though the benefits are high.
Our results show that more flexibility does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. In fact, subjects attained the
highest payoffs in Treatment II, where they did not need to make an impulsive shifting decision but instead had time
to contemplate several possible saving choices.
Finally, we consider the last three columns where we restrict the sample to subjects who behaved in line with the-
ory and decided not to borrow. Here, the coefficients for expected euro earnings are not significantly different across
all treatments. Some coefficients for the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ state of the world are larger. These subjects are indeed bet-
ter in using precautionary measures.
Result 4: i. We reject that saving and shifting are perfect substitutes on aggregate. In our experiments, we observe
considerable heterogeneity between the subjects in respect with substituting saving and shifting. Linear regressions
show that subjects substituted saving and shifting when given the opportunity to do so.
ii. As predicted, expected payoffs are significantly higher if either shifting or saving is allowed than when neither is
allowed. We also observe an ordering of expected payoffs where theory does not predict one: Expected payoffs are
significantly lower if only shifting is allowed compared to the case where either only saving is allowed or both saving
and shifting are allowed. Thus, while saving and shifting are substitutes, they are not perfect substitutes.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a two-period model with wage uncertainty. Our innovation is that we give the individual
the opportunity to smooth consumption by allocating time between periods (this new channel seems to become in-
creasingly important, as indicated by the emergence of the so-called gig economy). We use this model to compare
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four possible scenarios that individuals might be faced with by turning on and off our new shifting channel and the
well-established saving channel. Subsequently, we derive four hypotheses that we then test in laboratory experiments.
A novel feature of our consumption/saving experiments is that we tie them to a real-effort style task. This extends pre-
vious experiments by introducing an endowment effect, since subjects decide over own earnings rather than randomly
drawn income. We cannot reject the first three hypotheses that test whether the subjects in our experiments behave ac-
cording to theory when given either the saving or the shifting opportunity. Evidence supports our fourth hypothesis
as well. We find that subjects substitute saving for shifting and shifting for saving. However, we also observe that the
subjects do not substitute saving and shifting perfectly (as shown by significantly lower expected earnings in the treat-
ment where only shifting is allowed). This is similar to the result in Brown et al. (2019) who reject the strong form
model implying that gifts of time and money are perfect substitutes.
Taken together, we interpret our findings the following way: as in Ballinger et al. (2003) we find that the model
predicts behavior quite well. However, in contrast to Ballinger et al., the strong heterogeneity that we document
suggests that average behavior is driven by (at least) two types: one group of subjects adjusts according to theory, the
other one sticks to the learned status quo.
26
References
BALLINGER, T. P., E. HUDSON, L. KARKOVIATA, AND N. T. WILCOX (2011): “Saving behavior and cognitive
abilities,” Experimental Economics, 14(3), 349–374. Cited on page 5.
BALLINGER, T. P., M. G. PALUMBO, AND N. T. WILCOX (2003): “Precautionary saving and social learning across
generations: an experiment,” Economic Journal, 113(490), 920–947. Cited on pages 4, 26, and E.1.
BARTZSCH, N. (2008): “Precautionary saving and income uncertainty in Germany: new evidence from microdata,”
Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 228(1), 5–24. Cited on
page E.1.
BENITO, A. (2006): “Does job insecurity affect household consumption?,” Oxford Economic Papers, 58(1), 157–181.
Cited on page E.2.
BLUNDELL, R., AND T. MACURDY (1999): “Labor supply: a review of alternative approaches,” in Handbook of
Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card, vol. 3 of Handbook of Labor Economics, chap. 27, 1559–
1695. Elsevier. Cited on page 2.
BROADWAY, B., AND J. P. HAISKEN-DENEW (2018): “Keep calm and consume? Subjective uncertainty and precau-
tionary savings,” Journal of Economics and Finance. Cited on page E.2.
BROWN, A. L., Z. E. CHUA, AND C. F. CAMERER (2009): “Learning and visceral temptation in dynamic saving
experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), 197–231. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
BROWN, A. L., J. MEER, AND J. F. WILLIAMS (2019): “Why Do People Volunteer? An Experimental Analysis of
Preferences for Time Donations,” Management Science, 65(4), 1455–1468. Cited on pages 6 and 26.
BROWNING, M., AND A. LUSARDI (1996): “Household saving: micro theories and micro facts,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 34(4), 1797–1855. Cited on page 11.
CABALLERO, R. J. (1991): “Earnings uncertainty and aggregate wealth accumulation,” American Economic Review,
81(4), 859–871. Cited on page E.2.
CAGETTI, M. (2003): “Wealth accumulation over the life cycle and precautionary savings,” Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, 21(3), 339–353. Cited on page E.2.
CARROLL, C. D., AND M. S. KIMBALL (2008): “Precautionary saving and precautionary wealth,” in The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. by N. Durlauf, and L. Blume. MacMillan, 2nd edn. Cited on page 5.
CARROLL, C. D., AND A. A. SAMWICK (1998): “How important is precautionary saving?,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 80(3), 410–419. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
CHARNESS, G., U. GNEEZY, AND B. HALLADAY (2016): “Experimental methods: pay one or pay all,” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 131, 141–150. Cited on page 15.
27
CHARNESS, G., AND P. KUHN (2011): “Lab labor: what can labor economists learn from the lab?,” Handbook of
Labor Economics, 4, 229–330. Cited on pages 6 and 13.
DARDANONI, V. (1991): “Precautionary savings under income uncertainty: a cross-sectional analysis,” Applied Eco-
nomics, 23(1), 153–160. Cited on page E.1.
DICKINSON, D. L. (1999): “An experimental examination of labor supply and work intensities,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 17(4), 638–670. Cited on page 6.
DUFFY, J. (2016): “Macroeconomics: A survey of laboratory research,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed.
by J. H. Kagel, and A. E. Roth, vol. 2, 1–90. Princeton University Press. Cited on pages 4, 5, and 6.
DYNAN, K. E. (1993): “How prudent are consumers?,” Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 1104–1113. Cited on
page E.2.
EATON, J., AND H. S. ROSEN (1980): “Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 14(3), 365 – 374. Cited on page 7.
EECKHOUDT, L., R. J. HUANG, AND L. Y. TZENG (2012): “Precautionary effort: a new look,” Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 79(2), 585–590. Cited on page 6.
ENGEN, E. M., AND J. GRUBER (2001): “Unemployment insurance and precautionary saving,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 47(3), 545 – 579. Cited on page 4.
FAGERENG, A., L. GUISO, AND L. PISTAFERRI (2017): “Firm-related risk and precautionary saving response,”
American Economic Review, 107(5), 393–397. Cited on page 14.
FARBER, H. (2005): “Is tomorrow another day? The labor supply of New York City cabdrivers,” Journal of Political
Economy, 113(1), 46–82. Cited on page 2.
FISCHBACHER, U. (2007): “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” Experimental Eco-
nomics, 10(2), 171–178. Cited on page 17.
FLODE´N, M. (2006): “Labour supply and saving under uncertainty,” Economic Journal, 116(513), 721–737. Cited
on pages 5, 7, and 8.
FOSSEN, F. M., AND D. ROSTAM-AFSCHAR (2013): “Precautionary and entrepreneurial savings: new evidence from
German households,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 75(4), 528–555. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
FUCHS-SCHU¨NDELN, N., AND M. SCHU¨NDELN (2005): “Precautionary savings and self-selection: evidence from
the German reunification ”experiment”,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 1085–1120. Cited on pages 4
and E.1.
GA¨CHTER, S., L. HUANG, AND M. SEFTON (2016): “Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-
catching task,” Experimental Economics, 19, 687–712. Cited on pages 9, 13, and K.3.
28
GOURINCHAS, P.-O., AND J. A. PARKER (2002): “Consumption over the life cycle,” Econometrica, 70(1), 47–89.
Cited on pages 4 and E.2.
GREINER, B. (2015): “Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE,” Journal of the
Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114–125. Cited on page 17.
GUISO, L., T. JAPPELLI, AND D. TERLIZZESE (1992): “Earnings uncertainty and precautionary saving,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 30(2), 307 – 337. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
HARTWICK, J. M. (2000): “Labor supply under wage uncertainty,” Economics Letters, 68(3), 319–325. Cited on
page 7.
HECKMAN, J. J. (1993): “What has been learned about labor supply in the past twenty years?,” American Economic
Review, 83(2), 116–121. Cited on page 5.
HEY, J. D., AND V. DARDANONI (1988): “Optimal consumption under uncertainty: an experimental investigation,”
Economic Journal, 98(390), 105–116. Cited on page E.1.
HEYMAN, J., AND D. ARIELY (2004): “Effort for payment: A tale of two markets,” Psychological Science, 15(11),
787–793. Cited on page 3.
HUCK, S., N. SZECH, AND L. M. WENNER (2018): “More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, optimistic
beliefs, and performance,” Discussion paper. Cited on page 6.
HURST, E., A. LUSARDI, A. KENNICKELL, AND F. TORRALBA (2010): “The importance of business owners in
assessing the size of precautionary savings,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(1), 61–69. Cited on pages 4
and E.1.
JAPPELLI, T., AND L. PISTAFERRI (2017): The economics of consumption: theory and evidence. Oxford University
Press. Cited on pages 4, 8, and E.2.
JESSEN, R., AND D. ROSTAM-AFSCHAR (2014): “GRAPH3D: Stata module to draw colored, scalable, rotatable 3D
plots,” Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of Economics. Cited on page I.1.
JESSEN, R., D. ROSTAM-AFSCHAR, AND S. SCHMITZ (2017): “How important is precautionary labour supply?,”
Oxford Economic Papers, 70(3), 868–891. Cited on pages 5 and E.2.
KAPLAN, G., AND G. L. VIOLANTE (2014): “A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments,”
Econometrica, 82(4), 1199–1239. Cited on page 10.
KAZAROSIAN, M. (1997): “Precautionary savings: a panel study,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(2), 241–
247. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
KIMBALL, M. S. (1990): “Precautionary saving in the small and in the large,” Econometrica, 58(1), 53–73. Cited on
pages 4 and 8.
29
LOW, H. (2005): “Self-insurance in a life-cycle model of labor supply and savings,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
8(4), 945–975. Cited on page 5.
LUGILDE, A., R. BANDE, AND D. RIVEIRO (2019): “Precautionary saving: a review of the empirical literature,”
Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(3), 481–515. Cited on pages 4 and E.2.
LUSARDI, A. (1997): “Precautionary saving and subjective earnings variance,” Economics Letters, 57(3), 319 – 326.
Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
(1998): “On the importance of the precautionary saving motive,” American Economic Review, 88(2), 449–
453. Cited on pages 4 and E.1.
MARSHALL, A. (1920): Principles of economics. Macmillan, London, 8 edn. Cited on page 5.
MASTROGIACOMO, M., AND R. ALESSIE (2014): “The precautionary savings motive and household savings,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 66(1), 164–187. Cited on page E.1.
MEISSNER, T., AND D. ROSTAM-AFSCHAR (2017): “Learning Ricardian equivalence,” Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control, 82(Supplement C), 273–288. Cited on pages 5 and E.1.
MULLIGAN, C. B. (1998): “Pecuniary incentives to work in the United States during World War II,” Journal of
Political Economy, 106(5), 1033–1077. Cited on page 5.
NOUSSAIR, C. N., S. T. TRAUTMANN, AND G. VAN DE KUILEN (2014): “Higher order risk attitudes, demographics,
and financial decisions,” Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 325–355. Cited on page 16.
PARKER, S. C., Y. BELGHITAR, AND T. BARMBY (2005): “Wage uncertainty and the labour supply of self-employed
workers,” Economic Journal, 115(502), C190–C207. Cited on pages 7 and E.2.
PIJOAN-MAS, J. (2006): “Precautionary savings or working longer hours?,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 9(2),
326 – 352. Cited on page E.2.
PISTAFERRI, L. (2003): “Anticipated and unanticipated wage changes, wage risk, and intertemporal labor supply,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 21(3), 729–754. Cited on pages 5 and E.2.
SKINNER, J. (1988): “Risky income, life cycle consumption, and precautionary savings,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 22(2), 237 – 255. Cited on page E.2.
VENTURA, L., AND J. G. EISENHAUER (2006): “Prudence and precautionary saving,” Journal of Economics and
Finance, 30(2), 155–168. Cited on page E.2.
WANG, J., AND J. LI (2015): “Precautionary effort: another trait for prudence,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 82(4),
977–983. Cited on page 6.
ZELDES, S. P. (1989): “Optimal consumption with stochastic income: deviations from certainty equivalence,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 275–298. Cited on page E.2.
30
Appendix
Appendix
A Translation of the Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to this experiment!
In this experiment, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Your earnings in this experiment depend only on
the choices you make during the experiment. Please read the printed instructions and those shown on-screen carefully.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to use electronic devices other than your PC or to talk to other participants.
Please only use the computer programs and functions designated for the experiment. Should you have any questions,
please raise your hand. We will then quietly answer your question. If the question is of relevance for all participants,
we will loudly repeat and answer it.
Outline
Please read the instructions carefully. Afterward, you will answer a few quiz questions to make sure you understand
everything. Overall, the experiment will take about 1.5 hours.
The experiment is made up of three parts. The payoff you are able to receive in each separate part does not depend
on your behavior in the other parts.
Part 1
Part 1 is made up of three test periods, which gives you the opportunity to practice the assignment you will work on
in the second part (the assignment will be explained further down in Part 2). One of the three test periods is randomly
chosen for payoff. Only at the end of the experiment, you will be informed about which period was chosen. Further
information will show up on your screen.
Part 2
The second part is made up of four different rounds, which consist of two shifts each. The time during which you are
working on your assignment without an interruption is referred to as a shift. Only one of the four rounds is relevant
for your payoff. Which of the four round earnings will be paid out will be chosen at random. Only at the very end of
the experiment, you will be informed about the round that was chosen for payoff.
By working on the assignment you can earn points. Points are the currency of this experiment. The points you earn
during one shift will be converted into euros.
Round 1
In the first round, you are working on the assignment consisting of two shifts. In this round, each shift consists of a
period, which always lasts 180 seconds. A period is the time during which a particular earning is paid.
Your assignment
While working on the assignment you will see a task field in the middle of the screen, similar to the following figure.
Left of the task field you can see in which period and which shift you are currently in. As soon as you click the start
button, the countdown starts and balls start falling randomly from the upper part of the task field. The remaining time
is shown in the upper right corner of the screen. The catching tray can be moved by clicking “LEFT” or “RIGHT”
at the bottom part of the task field, in order to catch the balls. To catch a ball, the catching tray has to be positioned
right underneath the ball, at the moment the ball touches the tray. As soon as the ball touches the tray, the number
of balls caught increases by one. The number of the balls caught so far and the number of the current moves are
shown above the task field.
Each move of the catching tray generates costs. Each ball caught generates earnings. The cost of the next move is
shown above the task field. Underneath you can find the current overall costs. The current earnings per ball are
shown left of the task field. Underneath you can see your earnings in this shift in points and in euros.
Earnings in points are calculated as followed:
Earnings = Number of balls caught * Earnings per ball caught – Sum of the costs of the moves
Earnings per ball caught
In each period you will be informed about the earnings per ball caught. Your earnings per ball caught are always
100 points throughout the first period. In the second period, your earnings per ball caught are determined randomly.
The earnings may either be 180 points or 20 points. Both values occur with equal probability of 50 percent. In the
second period, the point and euro earnings for both 20 and 180 points can be found on the left and the right side of the
task field. Only at the end of the experiment you will learn which earning will be paid in the second period.
It is important to understand that your earnings per ball caught are randomly generated in the second period. Which
value your earnings have in one period, neither depends on the value your earnings had in previous periods nor on
the way you behaved in the previous periods. Only at the very end of the experiment you will be informed about the
actual value of your earnings in the second period. That implies that for the duration of the task, you do not know
which earnings are relevant for payoff, 20 or 180 points.
Costs for moves
At the start of each shift the cost for a move is always zero points. The cost per move increases in the number of
moves:
A.2
Cost per move = 0.1 * (number of moves so far)2
The cost per move is rounded to the closest integer. A table with chosen function values is included in the instructions.
Example: Supposing the number of your current moves is 30. The costs per move are calculated as 30*30*0.1 = 90.
The next click on “LEFT” or “RIGHT” consequently costs 90 points. After the next click, the number of your current
moves increases by one. The costs per move are calculated as 31*31*0.1 = 96.1. The result is rounded to the next
integer, 96.
Shift result
The sum of all the points you earned in one shift is your shift result. The higher your shift result, meaning the sum of
all points earned in one shift, the higher is the payoff in this particular shift. The shift result is converted to euros as
followed:
Shift result in euros = 4*[ln(shift result in points) – 7].
The following illustration shows the shift result in euros, depending on the points earned. A table with chosen function
values is included in the instructions.
Example: Suppose the number of points you earned in the first shift of a round is 6400. Your result for this shift
equals 4*[ln(6400) – 7) = 7.21 euros. In case you earn 100,000 points in the second shift, your result for this shift is
4*[ln(100,000) – 7] = 18.32 euros.
Rounds 2 to 4
The following sections inform you how rounds 2 to 4 differ from round 1.
Round 2
In round 2 you work on the task the same way you did in round 1, for two shifts (which correspond to the periods that
last 180 seconds each). Now you have the opportunity to save points after the first shift. You can transfer points from
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the first shift to the second shift. Points that you save are subtracted from the first shift result (accordingly, you earn a
lower euro amount in the first shift). The saved points are added to your second shift result (thus, resulting in a higher
shift result in euros).
You can save at most so many points that your euro earnings in the first shift are zero. You cannot save a negative
amount of points.
Round 3
In round 3 you can decide how much time you want to spend in each shift. Overall, you have 360 seconds at your
disposal. The earnings per ball caught in the first period (the first 180 seconds) remain 100 points and the earnings in
the second period (the following 180 seconds) remain either 20 or 180 points.
With a button under the task field, you can decide when to end the first shift. After that, the second shift begins.
Example 1: Suppose you end the first shift after 120 seconds. Your shift result for the first shift will be calculated
based on the earnings and costs for these 120 seconds. (During these 120 seconds, your earnings per ball caught equal
100 points since you are in the first period.) In the following shift 2, you work on the task for 240 seconds (360 minus
120 seconds). In the first 60 seconds of the second shift, you are still in period 1, meaning you earn 100 points per ball
caught. In the following 180 seconds, you are in period 2 and earn either 20 or 180 points per ball caught. Your shift
result in points in shift 2 is the sum of the earnings of both periods minus the cost for moves.
Example 2: Suppose you end the first shift after 240 seconds. During the first shift, you are in period 1 during the first
180 seconds and earn 100 points per ball caught. In the following 60 seconds, you are in period 2 and earn either 20 or
180 points (of which the costs are then subtracted). Throughout the second shift (which only lasts 120 seconds) you
are in period 2 and earn either 20 or 180 points per ball caught.
A.4
Round 4
In round 4 you can save points after the first shift (just as in round 2) as well as decide on the time you want to spend
in each shift (just as in round 3).
Part 3
The third part is with regards to content completely unrelated to the first two parts. The instructions for the third part
will be shown only on your screen.
Overall pay-out in euros
The result for a round equals the sum of both shift results.
Round result = shift 1 result in euros + shift 2 result in euros.
The overall payoff is calculated as followed:
Overall payoff = result of a random period of part 1 + result of a random round of part 2 + amount earned in part 3
The payoff of the random round is rounded to cents. This amount can drop under zero euros, meaning your payoff
might be negative. In this case, the loss will be settled with the earnings of the other parts. You will not leave this
experiment with a loss: Should the overall payoff be negative, you do not get a pay-out.
Questions
Now please answer the quiz questions about the contents of these instructions. Please raise your arm once you are
done. In case you have any questions, please also raise your arm. A person in charge will come to you and answer the
question.
A.5
B Tables with Selected Values of the Consumption and Cost Function (Part of the Printed
Instructions)
Table B.1: Cost Function
Costs
Number of movements so far Cost of next movement in points
0 0
2 0
4 2
6 4
8 6
10 10
12 14
14 20
16 26
18 32
20 40
22 48
24 58
26 68
28 78
30 90
32 102
34 116
36 130
38 144
40 160
42 176
44 194
46 212
48 230
50 250
52 270
54 292
56 314
58 336
60 360
B.1
Table B.2: Consumption
Function
Shift earnings
Earned points Value in euros
0 -25.00
1000 -0.37
2000 2.40
3000 4.03
4000 5.18
5000 6.07
6000 6.80
7000 7.41
8000 7.95
9000 8.42
10000 8.84
11000 9.22
12000 9.57
13000 9.89
14000 10.19
15000 10.46
16000 10.72
B.2
C Translation of the Quiz Questions (With Correct Answers)
QUIZ QUESTIONS
Please answer the following questions before the experiment starts. With these questions we merely intent to make
sure that you understand the instructions properly.
1. True or false? Your earnings in period 1 are always 100 points.
4True 2False
2. What is the probability that your earnings per ball caught in period 2 are 180 points?
50%
3. True or false? In rounds 3 and 4 you can influence the total duration for which you earn 100 points per ball
caught.
2True 4False
4. True or false? Each time a new shift begins the costs per movement are reset to zero.
4True 2False
5. In each shift increase the costs per movement in the number of movements so far. But this increase becomes
flatter in the number of movements so far.
2True 4False
6. Suppose you earned 10,000 points in the first shift and 1,000 points in the second shift. What are your euro
earnings in each shift and in the round?
10,000 points = 8.84 euros; 1,000 points = -0.37 euros; together 8.47 euros
7. Suppose that you (based on the earnings given under 6.) saved 2,000 points. What are your euro earnings in
each shift and in the round?
8,000 points = 7.95 euros; 3,000 points = 4.03 euros; together 11.98 euros
8. Suppose that you spent 100 seconds in the first shift.
a) How many seconds will you spend in shift 2?
260 seconds
b) For how many seconds will you earn 100 points per ball caught in shift 2?
80 seconds
c) For how many seconds will you earn either 20 or 180 points per ball caught in shift 2?
180 seconds
9. True or false? You will not learn your payoff during the entire experiment. Only at the very end you will learn
this.
4True 2False
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E.2
F First Order Conditions
Treatment I The first order conditions of the Lagrangian are (with partial derivatives denoted, e.g., in the form of
cyi =
∂c(yi,ei)
∂yi
, and the Lagrange multiplier denoted for treatment k as µk)
∂L Ii
∂yi
= Eε [cyi ]−µ I = 0,
∂L Ii
∂ei
= Eε [cei ]+µ
I(Eε [wiqei − vei ]) = 0.
Hence, after combining the two first order conditions, income and effort can be traded at a rate equal to the
difference between valued marginal production and marginal costs:
Eε [cyi(wiqei − vei)] =−Eε [cei ].
Treatment II Compared to Treatment I, optimal behavior is also subject to the net income Euler equation in Equation
(10):
cy1 = Eε [cy2 ],
Eε [cyi(wiqei − vei)] =−Eε [cei ].
Treatment III Here, the first order conditions are, again, given by:
cy1 = Eε [cy2 ], (10)
Eε [cyi(wiqei − vei)] =−Eε [cei ].
F.3
G Sample Characteristics
Table G.1 presents summary statistics of our sample. The median person switched to the certain amount of 25 euros
instead of the lottery between 65 euros or 5 euros with expected value of 35 in the questions for risk aversion. For
both measures of prudence the median person preferred the most prudent option. Subjects classified as other indicated
multiple switching points. This means that for all three measures, 85.4, 82.2, and 84.4 percent chose consistently to
switch only once. However, they seem not all to follow expected utility theory: while almost 90 percent of subjects
behaved according to a coefficient of relative prudence of greater than 2, only about 41 percent chose consistently with
a coefficient of relative risk aversion of greater than 1.
Table G.1: Summary of Subjects’ Observable Characteristics
% SD %
Age 23.0 (3.90) Field
Female 60.9 (48.92) Psychology 1.56
Semester 5.0 (3.84) Other 8.85
Extremely risk averse 42.2 Economics 10.42
Very, very risk averse 10.9 Humanities 10.42
Very risk averse 15.6 Sciences 12.5
Risk averse 9.4 Other social science 17.19
Not risk averse 4.7 Law 18.75
Risk loving 2.6 Business 20.31
Other 14.6 Subjective Effort
Variance Not demanding at all 6.25
Extremely prudent 65.1 Not demanding 28.65
Very prudent 7.3 Not demanding, not effortless 35.42
Prudent 4.7 Somewhat demanding 21.35
Not prudent 4.2 Quite demanding 6.77
Other 18.8 Very demanding 1.56
Stakes Attention to Risk
Extremely prudent 68.2 Inattentive 7.29
Very prudent 7.8 Risk pessimist 59.38
Prudent 3.6 Risk realist 24.48
Not prudent 4.7 Risk optimist 8.85
Other 15.6
RRA greater 1 46.9
RP greater 2 89.6
RRA greater 1 and RP greater 2 41.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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I Differences across treatment averages
The variables we consider important are savings, time spent in shift 1, (hypothetical) income cuts, and the number
of balls caught per movement. The upper panel of Table I.1 shows the differences of the mentioned variables in
Treatments II, III, and IV from Treatment I using subject fixed effects regressions (Treatment I’s mean of the respective
variable is equal to the constant in the regressions). The subject fixed effects assist in controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity due to a subject’s ability to catch balls or other time-invariant characteristics. The lower panel uses the
same approach but compares Treatments II and III with Treatment IV. The first column considers savings. In the upper
panel, we observe significant precautionary savings in Treatment II. In Treatment IV, the coefficient is smaller than in
Treatment II, which suggests that some savings might have been substituted by shifting.
I.1
Table I.1: Differences Across Treatments
Time Time Shift 1 Income Income Balls per Balls per
Savings Shift 1 ≤180 Cut Cut≥0 Move S1 Move S2
Treatment II-I 2011.64∗∗∗ 2011.88∗∗∗ 2011.88∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.17
(89.98) (90.01) (90.03) (0.08) (0.13)
Treatment III-I -14.34∗∗∗ -58.94∗∗∗ 934.84∗∗∗ 2094.02∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.24∗∗
(5.10) (3.25) (146.90) (124.37) (0.09) (0.11)
Treatment IV-I 1511.16∗∗∗ -9.47∗∗ -54.68∗∗∗ 2117.63∗∗∗ 2593.48∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(80.65) (4.41) (3.46) (158.77) (132.70) (0.08) (0.10)
Constant (TI) 0.00 180.00∗∗∗ 179.13∗∗∗ 0.28 142.34 2.84∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗
(49.94) (2.77) (1.51) (75.71) (119.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Subject Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.021 0.683 0.327 0.544 0.013 0.009
Observations 576 576 397 768 665 767 755
Treatment II-IV 500.48∗∗∗ -105.75 -519.35∗∗∗
(82.17) (153.68) (142.07)
Treatment III-IV -4.88 -7.85∗∗ -1182.79∗∗∗ -501.14∗∗∗
(4.70) (3.52) (153.83) (146.52)
Constant (TIV) 1511.16∗∗∗ 170.53∗∗∗ 125.61∗∗∗ 2117.63∗∗∗ 2617.62∗∗∗
(41.09) (2.35) (1.94) (87.50) (82.86)
Subject Fixed Effects X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.003 0.060 0.153 0.056
Observations 384 384 205 576 473
Estimation Equation: Differences across treatments estimated using individual-specific fixed effects.
Inference: Cluster robust (individual level) standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The lower panel of the table shows that this difference of about 25 percent in savings is significantly different from
zero between Treatment II and Treatment IV. The results in the second column confirm this. In the upper panel, we
can see that our subjects spent on average significantly less time in Treatment III (-14 seconds) and Treatment IV (-9
seconds) than in Treatment I (where time in shift 1 was fixed). The lower part of this column shows that we cannot
reject that the amount of shifting is the same in Treatments III and IV, though. The point estimate for Treatment IV
is smaller than for Treatment III, which again points to substitution, but is not statistically different from zero. In the
third column, we restrict the sample to subjects who decided to end work-shift 1 on or before 180 seconds. Of course,
the coefficients in the upper panel become larger in comparison to the second column.25 In the lower panel, we see
that the difference between Treatment III and IV is significant in the restricted sample. Our interpretation of this is
that a substantial fraction of subjects understands saving and shifting as substitutes and that they choose to combine
these two ways of intertemporal substitution.
How can we compare precautionary shifting (which is measured in seconds) with precautionary savings (which is
measured in points)? The fourth column shows the results of a thought experiment: We know from theory that savings
should be zero in the absence of wage risk and that both work-shifts should be equally long. Therefore, the observed
25 The point estimate of -59 seconds for Treatment III suggests that subjects on average shift too much since 179-59=120 seconds is smaller than
the prediction of 131 seconds that we report in the next section.
I.2
number of earned points in period 1, during the first 180 seconds, serves as the benchmark level of income y1 under
certainty.
To obtain a comparable measure of precautionary behavior, we compute the expected income at the end of
shift 1 minus savings and subtract it from y1. That means that income cuts are defined as income in period 1−
(expected income in shift 1− savings). If shifts and periods coincide, the only difference is income cuts due to sav-
ings; if savings are zero and shift 1 is shorter than period 1, this difference measures income cuts due to shifting (we
assume for this calculation that point earnings are uniformly distributed over time). Since income cuts are measured in
points, we can simply compare this measure across treatments. The fourth column shows that income cuts just equal
savings from the first column in this case. In the third treatment (second row), shifting is allowed, but not saving.
Therefore, we calculate the difference of income in period 1 to income obtained in shift 1. This is the measure for in-
come cuts in Treatment III. Similarly, in Treatment IV, this difference minus the amount of savings gives total income
cuts.
Using the entire sample, average income cuts in Treatment III seem to be too low to achieve the optimal in-
tertemporal substitution implied by the theoretical model calibrated with the estimated ability to catch balls, while in
Treatment IV the average amount is very close to the optimal. Statistically, the former value is different from that of
Treatment II but the latter is not. In the next column, we exclude all subjects from the sample that did not save, i.e.,
who have negative income cuts. This shows that while in Treatments II and III savings and shiftings were virtually
perfectly substituted, in Treatment IV significant excess income cuts take place.
Finally, the last two columns show that productivity is on average economically not significantly different across
treatments, although some statistically significant differences are detected. The constant shows that on average, the
subjects caught three balls.
I.3
J Estimation of Production Functions
Figure J.1 provides an overview of the means, histograms, and kernel density distributions of the number of caught
balls divided by the number of movements (balls per movementi = caught ballsi/
movementsi) in the two shifts for all four treatments, pooled for all subjects. The distributions appear to be very
similar and display a fair amount of dispersion. We conduct pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between the four
treatments for the variable balls per movement in the two shifts: all pairwise comparisons cannot reject the equality of
the distributions at the 5 percent percent level. We take this as evidence that we do not observe much learning in our
treatments after the previous three trial periods.
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Figure J.1: Means, distributions and kernel density distributions of balls per movement in the two shifts of all four
treatments
Source: Authors’ presentation.
Table J.1 displays pairwise correlations between balls per movement in the different treatments and shifts. All
correlation coefficients lie between 0.420 and 0.729 and are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
We take this as evidence for behavioral consistency as the dispersion observed in Figure J.1 is driven by the subjects’
heterogeneity of ability to perform the real-effort task: subjects who perform well in the real-effort task (and catch
many balls with one movement) in one treatment and shift, do so in all the other treatments and shifts as well.
J.1
Table J.1: Pairwise correlations of balls per movement in the two work-shifts in all treatments
TI, shift 1 TI, shift 2 TII, shift 1 TII, shift 2 TIII, shift 1 TIII, shift 2 TIV, shift 1
TI, shift 1 1
TI, shift 2 0.548∗∗∗ 1
TII, shift 1 0.598∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 1
TII, shift 2 0.464∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 1
TIII, shift 1 0.503∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 1
TIII, shift 2 0.547∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 1
TIV, shift 1 0.550∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 1
TIV, shift 2 0.553∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗
Significantly different from zero at p < 0.01: ∗∗∗.
Source: Own calculations.
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(b) Period 2
Figure K.2: Separate estimates of the production functions and observations in all four treatments
Source: Authors’ presentation.
K Fit of structural predictions
In order to calculate the point predictions for our variables of interest (savings and time spent in the two work-shifts)
using a structural model, we need to estimate a production function as supplied in Equation 8 with individual-specific
fixed effects.26 We estimate this function separately for the two periods (one problem with using only one estimation
is that it does not cover the values of movements and balls needed in one single period or shift; using periods comes
with the advantages that the two periods are equally long and that the wage uncertainty only affects the second period).
For period 1, our OLS estimation yields the following results (overall R2 = 0.65):
balls(moves) = 43.8091+6.3099×√moves−0.0001×moves2.
For period 2 (overall R2 = 0.73):
balls(moves) = 40.8174+6.9724×√moves−0.0010×moves2.
Figure K.2 displays the estimated production functions and the observations in all four treatments (similar to
Figure 3 in Ga¨chter et al. 2016, p. 696). Despite the heterogeneity between the subjects’ ability, the fit of these simple
polynomial regressions is quite high.
Table K.2 displays aggregate predictions based on these two production functions, the realized means and their
standard deviations in all treatments. First, this table shows how well the point estimates of the production functions
fit the average number of balls caught per period and, second, how well our model predicts movements per period,
average savings, and the average shifting choice. The first prediction exercise performs very well; the average number
of balls caught is predicted quite precisely for all treatments. No t-test indicates a significant deviation of the mean
from the prediction. This is not obvious, because we jointly fit the production functions for all treatments as an
econometrician would when being unable to identify under which restriction choices were made.
26 Section J in the Appendix supplies evidence that subjects do not learn over the course of the four treatments and that their performance is stable.
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Table K.2: Predictions of Extended Model and Data
TI TII TIII TIV
Prediction Prediction Prediction Prediction
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
Production function predictions
Balls Caught in Period 1 78.77 77.72 78.80 78.07
78.47 78.32 78.98 77.97
(10.82) (10.53) (11.64) (11.43)
Balls Caught in Period 2 74.59 73.95 70.58 71.22
73.92 73.48 70.76 72.61
(10.42) (11.05) (12.28) (12.23)
Model predictions
Movements in Period 1 25.46 25.46 25.46 25.46
32.71∗∗∗ 30.73∗∗∗ 32.99∗∗∗ 31.50∗∗∗
(18.44) (17.37) (19.13) (17.82)
Movements in Period 2 17.20 19.54 19.54 19.54
26.54∗∗∗ 25.20∗∗∗ 21.17 21.69∗
(17.53) (14.93) (16.60) (15.26)
Savings 0.00 1917.16 0.00 Substitutes?
0.00 2011.64 0.00 1511.16
(0.00) (1244.67) (0.00) (1115.59)
Time Spent in Shift 1 180.00 180.00 131.00 Substitutes?
180.00 180.00 165.66∗∗∗ 170.53
(0.00) (0.00) (70.54) (61.02)
Observations 192 192 192 192
Notes: Predicted means from period-specific individual-specific fixed effects estimations
(Balls Caught) and model predictions based on point estimates of these estimates. Below
predictions are sample means and standard deviations. Significance levels of one-sample
t-tests against predicted means are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Still, the model prediction exercise is much harder, since deviations from optimal behavior of only a few subjects
could lead to a rejection of the model. The model predictions are conditional on the estimates of the production
functions. Of course, these estimates are measured with an error that we do not take into account in the model
prediction explicitly. Instead, we report the results from using the point estimates in Table K.2.
On average, subjects systematically moved about six to eight moves more often than predicted in all treatments. Of
course, this is partly due to a few subjects making up to six-times the predicted number of moves (those disregarding
effort costs). This is similar for period 2 but only in Treatment I and II. In Treatments III and IV, where shifting is
allowed, it cannot be rejected that the average number of movements in period 2 is equal to the prediction.
How well does the model predict precautionary savings and shiftings? The table shows that the average savings in
Treatment II are not statistically different from the prediction. This shows that the model captures the savings decision
extremely well. However, although shifting does occur (time spent in shift 1 is on average 166 seconds), the model
predicts with 131 seconds in shift 1 even more shifting. Thus, a t-test rejects equality of average time spent in shift
1 and the model prediction. Regarding Treatment IV, there is no single prediction for savings and shiftings. Instead,
K.4
we can predict optimal combinations of these two choices and compare them to actual combinations chosen by the
subjects. We did this to classify substituters (as described in Section 5.2) and found that about 30 percent of all subjects
follow the theoretical prediction that saving and shifting are perfect substitutes closely.
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